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In the paper, we propose a methodological way of leading an economical assessment of 
innovative cropping systems (ICSs). The originality lies in the integration of the crop 
management flexibility and the farmers’ risk perception and risk preferences. Two 
conventional cropping systems have been studied (continuous irrigated maize and 
wheat/sunflower rotation). For each of them, an innovative long rotation has been co-designed 
by farmers to reach various objectives, notably reduce the pressure on natural resources. The 
methodological protocol is tested thought a sample of 23 specialized cash crop farmers of 
Southwestern France is surveyed: subjective probabilities linked to climatic risk perceived are 
assessed and farmers’ risk aversion is elicited through experimental lotteries. Without risk 
consideration, the adoption of ICSs should be discouraged, given the 2010-2011 crop price 
situation (mean gross margin loss of about 15 %). Accounting for the farmers’ risk perception 
and risk aversion, and using a risk criteria analysis the results are more mitigated. An adoption 
premium, computed for each farmer, shows that although all farmers are almost equally risk 
averse, the levels of adoption premiums are heterogeneous, due to different individual risk 
perceptions. Finally the paper proposes a method to account for risk preferences and 
subjective beliefs that raise heterogeneity in the attitude towards innovative cropping 
systems…   
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In the context of climate change, European arable farmers are more concerned with environmental 
regulations and are encouraged to reduce the use of chemical inputs (Water Framework Directive 
2000/60/EC, Ecophyto 2018 in France). In cash crop farms, innovations are designed at the cropping 
scale and consist in modifying the cropping system management1. This implies greater changes than 
the sole change in technical operations but also provides better long run results. Technical factors 
influencing these changes are more complex and take place over a longer period (a rotation can last up 
to six or seven years). A cropping system (CS) includes i) a succession of crops associated with ii) a 
crop management type applied to each, as well as iii) intermediary crops. The yearly crop management 
involves an ordered and logical set of operations. Innovative cropping systems (ICSs) have been 
designed in order to reach objectives to lower pressures on natural resources. The design can be 
initiated either by experts (de novo prototyping) or by farmers themselves, by using in-situ knowledge 
(co-design). In de novo prototyping, a group of experts, imagines and designs new prototypes without 
a priori constraints. Then prototypes must be tested prior to their diffusion. When prototyping involves 
pilot farms, which is the case in the experience reported here, information spreads simultaneously with 
conception (Vereijken, 1997). 
To discriminate the most adaptable cropping system, at the farm scale, an ex-ante evaluation of the 
systems built up is required (Debaeke et al., 2009). In conducting this evaluation, one has to consider 
that the adoption of innovative cropping systems is highly influenced by the farmers’ characteristics 
and also by farmers’ context (Pannell et al., 2006).  As usually admitted, conventional cropping 
systems are impacted by with yield uncertainty. Crop yields are strongly dependent to local soil-
climate context and yield predictions are always subjective. . The change in crop management in ICSs 
also entails additional yield uncertainty linked to the lack of knowledge. Therefore, both risk 
perceptions and risk preferences are individual characteristics that can influence the adoption behavior 
of ICSs. Indeed, depending on their psychological attitudes towards risk, the uncertainty inherent to an 
innovative cropping system will affect farmers differently. In order to address the risks linked to the 
change in farming practices, we propose to integrate risk assessment and farmers’ preferences and 
beliefs in the analysis. 
The Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model of Savage (1954) with known utilities and unknown 
probabilities can allow us to analyze individual behaviors under uncertainty. Although violations of the 
basic axioms of the Expected Utility (EU) Theory, SEU models have been implemented by many 
researchers, including Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In some studies applied to agricultural 
uncertainties, it was proved that the EU or SEU model remains representative of observed behaviors 
(Bocqueho et al. 2010; Dury et al, 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). 
                                                          
1
 A cropping system is a sequence of technical operations taking place over several years 
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Farmers’ preference direct elicitation methods are now more and more widespread in the economic 
literature. It is very well adapted to assess pure preferences of individual farmers (Binswanger and 
Siller, 1983; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). Through experimental methods with lottery games, risk 
aversion coefficients can be elicited (Holt and Laury, 2002; Tanaka et al, 2010; Bocqueho et al. 2010; 
Dury et al, 2010). 
. In a first step, the level of risk is evaluated through its distribution. As a starting point, we suppose 
that the perceived risk is influenced by the degree of flexibility of the farm management decisions. A 
technology will be perceived as riskier if it locks the planting decision for more than a year, and if the 
technical operations are not revisable. Two types of flexibilities exist: the inter-year and the intra-year 
flexibility. The inter-year flexibility is the change in crop succession, which is a way for farmers to 
deal with anticipated price variations. The inter-year flexibility, which deals with market risk, won’t be 
studied here: the crop succession is considered as not revisable since it needs to be adopted to reach 
the environmental objectives targeted during the design step. The intra-year flexibility concerns the 
various sequential stages of crop management over one year, called “technical operations”. In order to 
reach their yield objectives, farmers have to adapt their technical operations in response to climate risk 
(Just, 2003). By doing this, farmers can adapt their cropping systems to the externalities they deal with 
and cannot control (Tanaka et al., 2002). 
Some models of decision making are dealing with farmers’ production strategies and their constraints 
(economical, working time, farm machinery…) (Aubry et al., 1998). Some farming operations or are 
compulsory (sowing, harvest) and chronologically established (sowing after previous crop, harvest for 
instance). Other operations are flexible in time or technique (chemical or mechanical weeding) and are 
called “revisable”.  Some models of decision making are interested in decision rules or decision 
patterns and attempt to determinate the decision process itself (Dury et al, 2010). In this paper we 
won’t investigate the reasons of the management variability from one farmer to another but only the 
possible alternatives and their probability. We assume here that farmers can assess the relative 
likelihood of uncertain events by assigning subjective probabilities to these events. This probability 
assessment provides a way of analyzing the individual risk perceptions through farmers’ beliefs 
(Chavas et al., 2010, Hardaker et al., 2004). 
The aim of this paper is to propose a methodological way of leading an economic assessment of 
innovative long rotation cropping systems in three points  i) the accounting of technical flexibility of 
farmer’s decisions), ii) the  assessment of risk perceptions and iii) the elicitation of risk preferences. 
This methodology is tested through surveys among a sample of 23 specialized cash crop farms of 
Southwestern France. 
The first section of the paper proposes a definition of what is called “innovative cropping systems” 
and exposes the nature of the technical decisions we consider in the flexibility analysis. The second 
section proposes a theoretical framework to analyze farmers’ decision under uncertainty. The third 
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section presents the way data are obtained on risk perceptions and risk preferences among a sample of 
cash crop farmers. In section 4, the main outputs of the survey are combined to give an appraisal of the 
riskiness linked to the adoption of innovative cropping systems through two criteria: stochastic 
dominance of subjective risk distributions and the evaluation of an individual “adoption premium” that 
mitigates the risk linked to the new systems.  
 
Section 1 - Definition of innovative cropping systems  
The innovative cropping systems co-designed 
The innovative cropping systems have been co-designed by farmers jointly with local farming experts 
in South Western France. Those new cropping systems are tested in the field by volunteer farmers. 
They have been built up as an alternative to both most widespread cropping systems of south western 
France: continuous irrigated maize and short rotation of sunflower on wheat. Cash crop farmers feel 
more and more concerned about environmental damages (water use, soil erosion, water pollution such 
as nitrogen lixiviation or pesticides transfers in the aquifer) that induce a decrease in soil fertility in the 
long run.  In a context of increasing prices of farm inputs, farmers also seek input saving strategies. 
Innovative cropping systems (ICSs) seem to suit well those objectives: saving strategies and natural 
resources conservation. They are long rotation, combining conventional agronomic management 
(rotation, leguminous crops to reduce fertilizers use…) and new technological improvements, to reach 
a low input crop management. The introduction of intermediary crops and the alternation of crops 
from different botanical families enable to decrease the pressure on natural resources. New technical 
practices (harrow chain, precise row treatments) allow a decrease in pesticides used to avoid diseases 
resistance problems.  
The aims of the design are to improve soil fertility in the long run and to maintain a reasonable 
average income. During the design step, a few profitable crops, technically mastered by farmers, have 
been kept into the rotation, in order to insure a minimum income. Designers have also introduced 
beneficial crops that may be  less profitable (pea) but which allow agronomic improvements (less 
nitrogen loss, better soil conservation) and/or crops that imply specific marketing contracts (rape 




                                                          
2 Some indicators have been proposed to evaluate environmental or social impacts of the ICS. This part won’t be 
exposed in this paper but this “multicriteria approach” is available in Annex 1and Source: Office of Coordination 














 Decrease pest pressure 
 No bare soil in winter 
Wheat(intercrop) / Soybean /Wheat / Oil seed Rape 
(grow again) / Maize / Sunflower 
Cropping 
system 2 
Wheat / Sunflower 
rotation 
 Decrease pest pressure 
 Use agronomic tools 
 Working time staggering 
Sunflower / Wheat(intercrop) / Sorghum / Wheat / 
Pea/Rape seed / Wheat(intercrop) 
 
Definition of intra-year flexibility: revisable and non-revisable decisions  
For a complete appraisal of risk perception, we decompose the decisions into the different technical 
operations. This should enable us to evaluate farmer’s intra-year flexibility. The different technical 
operations occurring along one year are first detailed for each crop of the crop succession. Each 
operation is characterized by its production cost. Two types of operations are distinguished: those that 
are certain and those that are revisable, so that a probability tree can be built. Farmers have to sow or 
harvest for sure, but, they can remove a fungicide or fertilization application if considered as not 
necessary: the probability linked to each farming operation depends on individual risk assessment. The 
threshold of treatment is a subjective evaluation for each farmer even if decision rules or baselines are 
available. Each node of the probability tree corresponds to a revisable operation, for which several 
options are possible. Subjective probabilities assigned to each branch are directly assessed by 
proposing risk scales to farmers for each risky operation (Annex 3). A probability tree is designed for 
each crop of both conventional and innovative cropping systems. The probability distribution is 
assessed for each farmer, considering the previous crop in the crop rotation. Decision trees are 
elaborated for each crop ad crop trees are aggregated at the rotation scale in order to obtain cost 
distributions for each long rotation cropping system (6 or 7 years of rotation). Partial adoption is 
excluded3. Considering the yield distribution also assessed by farmers (?̃?𝑐) (Annex 4) and a given 
expected market price for each crop (𝑝𝑐), distributions of the total Gross Margin (𝐺?̃?), at the rotation 
scale, for both conventional and innovative cropping systems, can be estimated (Equation 1)  
 
 





                                                          
3
 ICS have been design with a long run agronomical coherence, the adoption of a crop with an innovative crop 
management for one or two years cannot be consider as an innovative system 
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Figure 1: Example of a probability tree  
 
 
Section 2: Theoretical approach of farmer’s decision under uncertainty 
A theoretical framework in economics is proposed to approach farmer’s decision under uncertainty. As 
mentioned before, the only source of risk considered is yield risk. We assume that farmers are reluctant 
to implement innovative and low input cropping systems because of a probable higher risk exposure . 
In order to assess both the level of risk perceived and individual preferences towards risk, we propose 
to rely on an expected utility framework.  
Subjective distributions of risk linked to both conventional and innovative systems are first elicited in 
order to lay out a comparison in terms of level of risk perceived (criteria of stochastic dominance). A 
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) criterion is proposed. But it doesn’t take the individual risk 
aversion into account. Therefore, in a second step, an experimental protocol of direct elicitation of 
preferences is implemented. The estimation of the level of risk aversion, combined with an estimation 
of the subjective risk distributions, enables us to have a global view of adoption, considering both 




First order stochastic dominance  
In order to apply the FOSD criteria to the distribution elicited among farmers, we estimate the 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the total gross margin per hectare (𝐺?̃?), cumulated during 
the whole rotation. According to the FOSD criterion, the less risky cropping systems are selected, i.e., 
under this criteria ICSs are preferred by farmers if and only if, for all values of x CDF(GMCS(x)) - 
CDF(GMICS(x)) 0 . Graphically, the cumulative distribution function of ICSs is to the right of the 
distribution function of CSs so that they do not cross. When a CS dominates another according to the 
FOSD, it signifies that all decision makers with increasing utility function prefer this CS.  
Adoption premium  
The stochastic dominance criterion only implicitly integrates individual preferences. A protocol has 
been built to estimate farmers’ pure preferences and the complete preference function can be used to 
calculate an Adoption Premium (noted AP) for ICSs (Equation. 3). Assuming that farmers aim at 
maximizing their expected utility function, the adoption premium is the monetary compensation 
required for each area under innovative CS, to make farmers indifferent with conventional CSs. The 
adoption premium is close to the risk premium concept. A risk premium evaluates the monetary 
amount that individuals are ready to pay to avoid risk by choosing a secure alternative whereas, in this 
study, both cropping systems, conventional and innovative, are risky. The adoption premium measures 
the effort for each individual to adopt an ICS. The utility function U is assumed to be DARA-CRRA4 
(Equation 4). 









GMCS1 and GMICS1: Continuous irrigated maize and its alternative gross margin are noted  
GMCS2 and GMICS2: Wheat/sunflower rotation and its alternative gross margin are noted  
AP : Adoption Premium 
EU: Expected utility 
RRA: Coefficient of relative risk aversion 
                                                          
4
 Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion, Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
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Section 3 - Data 
Data concerning risk attitudes have been collected among a sample of 23 cash crop farmers in 
Southwestern France. 
Farmers’ sample and structure of the survey 
Farmers have been surveyed by groups during meetings (11 of them) or face to face interviews (12 
interviews) during Spring 2012. Survey presentation was the same for individual and collective 
interviews. Even during meetings, farmers answered individually without any cooperation. The Annex 
5 presents the farmers and farms characteristics. The survey is composed of four parts; i) background 
information, farm structure, ii) frequency of the different farming operation for all crops present in the 
rotation, considering the previous crop and according to both different cropping systems (innovative 
and conventional), iii) a “Visual Impact” method (Hardaker et al,. 2004) to evaluate subjective 
probabilities concerning yields; iv) an experimental protocol, previously proposed by Holt and Laury 
(2002), to elicit farmers’ preferences  
Assessing the frequency of farming operations 
The annual crop management is exposed in details to each participant. It is composed of all technical 
operations color coded (grey for the certain operation and white for the revisable). In order to estimate 
the farmers’ subjective probabilities linked to the different revisable operations, farmers are asked to 
rate, on a decade, the frequency of each operation. For each revisable operation farmers have to 
choose, on a Likert scale, the frequency, from “never” to “always”, with 5 degrees (Annex 3). The 
farmer answer to this question for all the crops of the conventional and innovative cropping systems, 
some crops being under both conventional and innovative management but with different techniques 
and preceding crop, such as wheat, maize or sunflower.  
Assessing subjective probability for crop yields 
Each farmer is asked to state his subjective yield prediction. This evaluation is done for all the crops of 
each CS. According to the Visual Impact method, designed by Hardaker et al. (2004), several yield-
intervals of yield are proposed to the participant who has to allocate tokens to each yield interval. The 
probability of each interval is the ratio of the number of tokens allocated to this interval divided by the 
total number of tokens used. The participant also has to rate the level of confidence in his own 
prediction from 1 to 10.. To ensure a good understanding of the crop management, it is exposed in 
details to farmers next to the visual impact table (Annex 4). 
Risk preferences elicitation method  
We employ an experimental procedure to elicit attitudes towards risk, called a multiple price list, 
previously proposed by Holt and Laury (2002This experimental framework corresponds to an 




In a first treatment, subjects are provided with a series of binary choices for four sets of tasks. The first 
two sets involved choosing between binary risky alternatives (with known probabilities) in the gain 
domain, and the second two sets in the loss domain with variable probabilities (Annex 6). 
Additionally, in a second treatment, as in Tanaka et al (2010), subjects are also faced four series of 
binary choices but with fixed probabilities (Annex 7).  
In the first treatment, each task set table had ten decisions (see Table 2 for example of task in the gain 
domain). 
Table 2: MPL Task in the gain domain 
Question Lottery A Lottery B CRRA Range 
1 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
1 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
9 chances 
out of 10 
RRA ≤ -0.95 
2 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
2 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
8 chance 
out of 10 




out of 10 
16€ 
7 chances 
out of 10 
38,5 
3 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
7 chance 
out of 10 
-0.95 ≤ RRA ≤ -0.49 
4 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
4 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
6 chance 
out of 10 
-0.49 ≤ RRA ≤ - 0.15 
5 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
5 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
5 chance 
out of 10 
-0.15 ≤ RRA ≤ 0.15 
6 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
6 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
4 chance 
out of 10 
0.15 ≤ RRA ≤ 0.41 
7 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
7 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
3 chance 
out of 10 
0.41 ≤ RRA ≤ 0.68 
8 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
8 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
2 chance 
out of 10 
0.68 ≤ RRA ≤ 0.97 
9 
20€ 




out of 10 
38,5 
9 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
1 chance 
out of 10 




out of 10 
16€ 
0 chance 
out of 10 
38,5 
10 chance 
out of 10 
1€ 
0 chance 
out of 10 
1.37 ≤ RRA 
 
Subjects are shown different binary lotteries and must select either option A (the safe lottery) or option 
B (the risky lottery) for each decision. The payoffs in Euros for option A are fixed at 20 and 16 while 
the payoffs for option B are fixed at 38 and 1. In each successive row, the likelihood of receiving the 
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larger payoff increases. As the probability of the high payoff outcome increases option B becomes 
more attractive relative to option A, and at some point subjects will switch their preference.  A risk 
neutral subject would choose option A up to decision number 4, and then choose option B from 
decision number 7 to 10. Hence a risk neutral participant would switch from the safe option to the 
risky option at the 5th decision, while sooner (later) such a switch occurs, the more risk seeking 
(averse) the subject is. By assuming constant relative risk aversion, the subject risk aversion is then 
directly related to the line at which he switches from preferring option A to preferring option B going 
down the table. 
Subjects have also been asked to complete the same lottery task as in Table except that all payoffs 
have been multiplied by a factor 20.  In the same way, participants have completed two sets of tasks in 
the domain of losses (Annex 6).  
In the second treatment, as in Tanaka et al. (2010) and Bocqueho et al. (2010), subjects are presented 
with a succession of pair of binary lotteries with fixed probabilities. These are four series of questions. 
In the first two series, payoffs are all positive whereas, in the third series, lotteries mix positive and 
negative outcomes and in the last series, payoffs are all negative (Annex 7).  
The participants were recruited by invitation via phone and were told that depending upon their 
decisions; they had a chance of earning real money. Each participant was hosted on separate days, 
some by groups but with independent answers. The experiment was conducted by using decision 
sheets which the subjects filled out manually. They were told that for all the tasks, they would be paid 
on one randomly chosen decision number so that each subject received payments for one decision. The 
subjects received an endowment at the beginning of the experiment and were told that even if they lost 
money during the course of the experiment, their total earned income from the experiment could not 
be negative. On average a subject earned 20.50€ for participating in a session. These four sessions 
were conducted over the period of February to April 2012. (Detailed instructions of the experiment are 
available upon the authors). 
 
Section 4 - Results 
This section exposes the outcomes of the evaluation of the ICSs, compared with conventional CSs by 
using the different evaluation criteria mentioned in the previous section : i) comparison of mean gross 
margins, ii) comparison under the FOSD criterion, iii) comparison of the levels of Adoption 
Premiums.. All farmers have specialized cash crop systems but, farming practices are heterogeneous 
due to local soil and climate variability. Some heterogeneity also comes from farm sizes and 





Evaluation of the CSs under certainty 
The CSs (conventional and innovative) are evaluated without accounting for yield or cost variability. 
The data basis gathers the information to calculate gross margin and other indicator from the Office of 
Coordination of Agricultural Machinery and master data from the extension services. The average 
yield reported on table 5 corresponds to the objective yield declared consensually by the group of 
farmers during the design step. The market prices are mean value observed during the 2010-2011 
season by a cooperative society (Annex 8). During this crop season market prices were high compared 
with the previous year. The production cost was evaluated with the cropping management designed by 
the group of farmers during the co-design, considering appearance of all the technical operations with 
certainty; then  it is the maximum cost (tables 3 and 4). 




Innovative CS 1 
Crops 
Continuous maize 













Cost (€/ha) 1 237 464 711 636 711 340 908 
Objective yield (t/ha) 12.00 3.00 8.25 3.50 8.25 3.75 12.00 
Market Price (€/t) 185 420 180 330 180 330 185 
Gross margin (€/ha) 982 795 774 519 774 897 1 312 
Cumulated gross 
margin (€/ha) 
5 895    5 073   
Sources: Cost data: Office of Coordination of Agricultural Machinery, Extension services; Price data: Cooperative society 
 
Table 4: Price and cost evaluation under certainty of the wheat/sunflower rotation and the innovative cropping system  
 Conventional CS 2 Innovative CS 2 
Crops 
Sunflower 
























Cost (€/ha) 428 550 311 589 281 589 612 688 589 
Objective yield (t/ha) 2.5 4.5 2.5 4.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 2.5 4.5 
Market Price (€/t) 420 200 420 200 180 200 190 450 200 
Gross margin 622 350 739 311 618 311 147 437 311 
Cumulated gross 
margin (€/ha) 
3 401 2 876 
Sources: Cost data: Office of Coordination of Agricultural Machinery, Extension services; Price data: Cooperative society 
 
The evaluation under certainty shows that the ICSs have a lower cumulated gross margin than the 
conventional ones, from -14% to -15%. Without any flexibility and without consideration for labor 
constraint, and assuming that farmers aim at reaching the maximum income, ICSs will be excluded 
from the cropping plan. However this evaluation neglects the yield variability, which can be higher for 
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innovative management. Furthermore, the crop management can be revised in reaction to soil or 
sanitary conditions and adapted, inducing different production costs from one farmer to another. Even 
if the evaluation of the gross margin is useful and allows discriminating cropping systems, it is 
difficult to determinate whether ICSs will be adopted by farmers or not, especially when the gross 
margin differential is not high.   
Evaluation the CSs accounting for risk perceptions 
In this section, the results are focused on two farmers’ cases (“type 1” farmer and “type 2” farmer) 
from the same area, with the same farm characteristics (crops, level of specialization…), so that the 
only difference between both lies in the risk attitude. Thus, the yield and cost distributions are 
compared for three crops managed under both conventional and innovative techniques: wheat, maize 
and sunflower. The mean yield and cost and the related dispersion (standard deviation) are reported in 
table 5.  
Table  5 : Yield and cost mean and standard deviation distribution per farmer  
  “type 1” farmer “type 2” farmer 

























 (Continuous maize) 
 
120 
113 6.9 1 507 232.2 115.0 6.3 838 53.4 












82,5 70 8.4 494 10.3 62.0 8.4 634 25.2 












33 1.5 423 0 22.0 1.5 423 0 





30 1.5 339 0 25.2 1.6 295 0 
ICS 2 












55 2.5 534 9.2 57.2 2.5 518 0 





45 42 3.0 561 24.1 50.0 2.5 547 34.0 
Sources: Cost data: Office of Coordination of Agricultural Machinery, Extension services; Yield data: own survey  
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Even if the farm and farmer’s characteristics are close, table 5 shows that risk perceptions are 
different. For “type 1” farmer, innovative cropping management on maize and sunflower allows a 
yield increase but wheat is perceived as less productive under innovative practices. For “type 2”farmer 
the innovative cropping management is almost always less productive than the conventional one, 
expect for maize; the maize yield is perceived higher with innovative crop management for both 
farmers, which might be due to the fact that positive agronomic rotational positive effects are expected 
with little uncertainty. 
The production costs are really different among both farmers, especially for maize and soft wheat. 
However they both consider that the innovative crop management is less expensive for maize and 
sunflower. At the opposite, both soft and durum wheat have a higher and more variable production 
cost under innovative practices. This gap is principally due to a higher mechanization cost. Pest 
treatments are generally replaced by mechanical techniques (harrow chain, hoe…) more expensive and 
less mastered by farmers.  
This analysis shows that risk perceptions bring heterogeneity among similar farming systems. Maize 
and sunflower are generally more productive and less expensive with an innovative cropping 
management. For the other crops, farmers’ risk assessments are variable. This shows that an analysis 
of crop profitability under certainty is probably inadequate considering the variability of individual 
risk perceptions and considering also crop management flexibility.  
 
Stochastic dominance analysis   
As explained in the former section with the First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) analysis the 
risk perception is appraised at the cropping system scale. The probability trees and the yield 
assessment enable to calculate the gross margin distribution. The Cumulative Distribution Function 
(CDF) of the total gross margin of both conventional and innovative CSs are compared two by two. 
The FOSD analysis enables a visual discrimination of the less risky system. If the Cumulative 
Distribution Function of the CS is always located under the alternative CDF (if they never cross), then 









Figure 2: “Type 1” farmer cumulative distribution functions of both innovative and conventional systems for the 
continuous maize 
 
Figure 3: “Type 1” farmer cumulative distribution functions for both innovative and conventional systems for the 
wheat/sunflower rotation 
 





















Gros margin (€/ha) 
Farmer "Type 1" 

















Gross margin (€/ha) 
Farmer "Type 1" 

















Gross margin (€/ha) 
Farmer "Type 2" 
Conventional CS continuous maize Innovative CS 1
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Figure 5: “Type 2” farmer cumulative distribution functions for both innovative and conventional systems for the 
wheat/sunflower rotation 
 
 As previously seen in table 3, farmers’ perceptions concerning the risk linked to ICSs are different. At 
the cropping system scale, “type 1” farmer assesses the wheat/sunflower rotation as less risky than its 
innovative alternative. For the continuous irrigated maize the FOSD criterion does not clearly 
discriminate both systems since the curves are crossing. At the opposite, the irrigated maize is 
perceived as less risky by “type 2” farmer and there is no possible discrimination concerning the level 
of risk assigned to wheat/sunflower rotations. The FOSD criterion thus allows sorting some cropping 
systems. However FOSD does not enable to precisely measure the degree of the preference of one 
system compared to another. Furthermore, if the CDF curves are crossing it is not possible to 
determinate which system is preferred by the farmer.  
Individual preferences analysis: flexibility and risk aversion  
The previous CS classification integrates the farmers’ cropping management flexibility. However, 
under different farm contexts, it is not possible to distinguish the CS that will be preferred. This 
analysis can be complemented by considering farmers’ individual preferences. The protocol of 
elicitation of  the relative risk aversion among the sample of 23  reveals a coefficient varying from 
0.60 to 0.85 and a mean value of 0.75 for the whole sample. The master table of Holt and Laury 
attributes, for each RRA coefficient, a qualitative level of risk aversion from “risk loving” to 
“extremely risk averse” (Holt and Laury, 2002). Our values exhibit a high level of relative risk 
aversion. This result is consistent with the works using this same method of elicitation (Reynaud et al 
2010).  
 
Level of adoption premium  
Considering the two previous aspects (CS flexibility and risk aversion) we evaluate an adoption 
premium for each farmer of the sample. This premium measures the financial effort that makes the 

















Gross margin (€/ha) 
Farmer "Type 2" 
Conventional CS wheat/sunflower Innovative CS 2
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premium with the difference that, in this case, there is no opposition between a secure and a risky 
situation but two risky situations.  It does not only account for the difference of mean gross margins 
between both alternatives, but also integrates individual risk perceptions and risk aversion. We use the 
individual RRA coefficient obtained with the experimental protocol of each farmer. We also quote the 
adoption premium as percentage of the conventional gross margin (fig. 6 and 7).  
Concerning the alternative to continuous irrigated maize, (6 year rotation, noted ICS 1), farmers “type 
1” and “type 2” show opposite results. While “type 2” needs a high effort, more than 600 €/ha (more 
than 50% of the gross margin), to adopt the ICS, the adoption premium is negative for “type 1” farmer. 
Without any adoption premium, “type 1” farmer would adopt the ICS if he has the possibility. The 
wheat/sunflower alternative cropping system will be easily adoptable by “type 2” farmer with a 
negligible effort, while the adoption premium is higher for “type 1” farmer (200 €/ha).  
 











































































































































The adoption premium varies from one farmer to another due to the integration of risk beliefs and 
preferences and crop management flexibility. Considering the ICS 1, alternative to the continuous 
maize, the levels of adoption premium are high, more than 200 €/ha/year for the majority of farmers. 
Even if the mean premium is high, some farmers show an adoption premium low or negative. A 
negative premium means that, for those farmers, the ICS 1 is already considered as less risky than the 
conventional one. The results are really heterogeneous, but in terms of percentage of the gross margin, 
the premium does not overpass 50%. We can distinguish three groups of farmers. The first group is 
composed of farmers with high level of risk premium representing around 50% of their gross margin. 
Those farmers will hardly adopt the ICS or will need a great effort. The second group is composed of 
farmers with a medium adoption premium from 0 to 250 €/ha/year (farmers 7, 6, 23, 15 and 2). This 
premium represents around 25% of their gross margin. Those individuals will be possible adopters 
with a suitable support (advice, financial support…). Finally the third group gathers farmers with 
negative adoption premium; they should adopt the ICS without any incentive (farmers 14, 33, “type 1” 
and 18).  Those last four farmers are in the same production area and already have rotations in a part of 
their farm. The change between continuous maize and the innovative cropping system seems less risky 
for them. They master the cultural itinerary of some crops consequently the change is less uncertain 
for them. At the opposite the non-adopters farmers, with high level of adoption premium, have 
specialized cropping system. The ICS is unknown for them; they have never grown the crops. They 
might overweight bad events on yields because the new system seems more risky.  



































































































































Adoption premium ICS 2 % of the GM
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premium: the mean premium is around 140€/ha/year for the whole sample without any negative 
premium (fig. 7). This cropping system seems more attractive, even if some farmers have higher 
adoption premiums (more than 30% of the gross margin of conventional systems: farmers 15, 16, 22, 
8, 11, 20, 13 and 14). There is also a group of possible adopters with low adoption premium (farmers 
“type 2”, 17, 1, 3, 18, 2, 23, 5, 6 and 19). As previously, we can distinguish three groups from the less 
to the more adopters. Some farmers, like farmer 1 and 5, will easily adopt both innovative cropping 
systems. Farmers have already experienced this rotation in their crop acreage, thus they are more 
aware of the technical aspects and beneficiate of a better information to estimate risks The other 
farmers are not in the same group for the two cropping system. Farmers are generally specialized in 
one of the conventional cropping system or the other (continuous maize or wheat/sunflower) so they 
do not have the same information and knowhow for all crops. This consideration can explain the 
difference of behavior between the two alternative situations. However, because of the farmers sample 
size these conclusions cannot be generalized.  
The differences of level of AP within our sample are not linked to the risk aversion. The level of risk 
aversion is close between farmers and the coefficient is constant between both systems. The 
integration of the risk perception (yield and crop management) induces this heterogeneity and allows a 
more accurate evaluation of the ICS adoption. This also means that accounting for risk aversion gives 




In this paper we propose a method to evaluate the adoption of new cropping systems integrating the 
flexibility of crop management and the farmers’ risk preferences (risk beliefs and risk aversion). We 
use subjective assessments with a field-survey among 23 cash crop farmers. The analysis under 
certainty gives an inadequate picture of  farmers’ behavior, and leads to exclude the adoption of ICSs 
in a 2010-2011 crop price situation because of  a loss in the mean gross margin of about -14 to -15 %. 
On average, our approach shows that, in the sample, farmers are risk averse (mean RRA coefficient of 
about 0.75). By choosing two cases of contrasted farmers inside this sample, we show that risk 
perceptions can be different among individuals and can change the hierarchy of CSs. An individual 
approach is required to approach the adoption behavior of farmers and enables us to quote an adoption 
premium, integrating both risk aversion and risk perceptions.  
This paper proposes an economic assessment of innovative cropping systems, integrating individual 
risk preferences and beliefs. Through this approach of farmers’ preferences, we theoretically account 
for the whole costs and benefits at the individual scale (including agro-ecological benefits, labor 
constraint…). But the calculation of multiple criteria linked to the different CSs, such as labor input or 
20 
 
environmental pressure indicators, is not done here. The calculation of pressure indicators could 
complete this approach. Concerning the adoption premium, the level of incentive that could be 
distributed to farmers in order to make them adopt the new systems has to be balanced with the public 
good possibly jointly produced: the mitigation of water pollution at river basin or global scale for 
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Soft wheat 91.5 680.6 3.0 4.7 
Soybean 68.0 575.7 3.0 2.9 
Soft wheat 91.5 680.6 3.0 4.7 
Oilseed rape 84.5 288.0 2.0 4.3 
Maize 85.5 848.0 1.2 5.0 
Sunflower 68.5 464.5 1.0 3.8 
Mean 81.6 589.6 2.2 4.2 
Source: Office of Coordination of Agricultural Machinery 









Sunflower 53.0 311.0 1.3 3.0 
Durum wheat 91.5 589.0 3.0 4.7 
Sorghum 57.5 281.2 0 3.2 
Durum wheat 91.5 589.0 3.0 4.7 
Pea 128.5 612.5 4,9 7.6 
Rapeseed 107.0 687.8 5.5 8.0 
Durum wheat 91.5 589.0 3.0 4.7 
Mean 88.6 522.9 2.9 5.1 





                                                          
5 The treatment frequency index or TFI is a pesticides use indicator corresponding to :  
TFI = Dose of pesticide applied per hectare / Dose homologated per hectare 
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Annex 3 : Example of the assessment of the subjective probabilities on the technical operations  
 
Likert scale Corresponding frequency Corresponding probability 
Never 0 year on a decade 0 
Rarely 1 to 3 years on a decade 0.25 
Sometimes 4 to 6 years on a decade 0.5 
Very Often 7 to 9 years on a decade 0.75 
Always 10 years on a decade 1 
 











Innovative soft wheat 
Two fertilization are planned for this crop :  
You will do the first fertilization:  
You will apply weed killer:  
 Never   Rarely   Never   Rarely  
 Sometimes     Very Often   Sometimes     Very Often  
 Always   Always  
You will do the second fertilization: You will apply the first fungicide:   
 Never   Rarely  
 Sometimes     Very Often   Never   Rarely  
 Always   Sometimes     Very Often  
You will weed with harrow chain:   Always  
 Never   Rarely  You will apply the second fungicide:  
 Sometimes     Very Often   Never   Rarely  
 Always   Sometimes     Very Often  
   Always  
 
Yield interval Tokens  Total Tokens  
50-55 quintals   
55-60  quintals   
60-65  quintals   
65-70  quintals   
70-75  quintals   
75-80  quintals   
80-85  quintals   
  
Please indicate from 1 to 10 your confidence level in your yield distribution:   




Annex 5 : Farmers’ sample  
Survey area Razes (30,4%) Gers (30,4%) Lauragais (26,1%) Ariège (13,0%) 
Marital status Married (14 ; 60,9%) Single  (7 ; 30,4%) Married (2 ; 8,7%)  
Soil clay limestone (78,3%) boulbènes (26,1%) clay-loam (4,3%)  




(4 ; 17,4%) 
Hose winding drum  
(3 ; 13,0%) 
Engagement in an 
network 
No (91,3%) Yes (8,7%)   
Pluriactivity No (69,6%) Yes (30,4%)   





Age 39 11.3 23 62 
Number of 
dependent person 
0.82 1.26 0 5 
Utilized 
agricultural area 




32.7 44.1 0 140 
Area owned 58.6 51.8 0 160 
Labour unit 1.7 0.9 1 4 
Source : own survey, 2012, April 
 
Annex 6 : Set of lotteries in the gain and loss domains with variable probabilities 
Question Lottery A Lottery B 
1 
20€ 
1 chance out of 10 
16€ 
9 chances out of 10 
38,5€ 
1 chance out of 10 
1€ 
9 chance out of 10 
2 20€ 
2 chance out of 10 
16€ 
8 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
2 chance out of 10 
1€ 
8 chance out of 10 
3 20€ 
3 chance out of 10 
16€ 
7 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
3 chance out of 10 
1€ 
7 chance out of 10 
4 20€ 
4 chance out of 10 
16€ 
6 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
4 chance out of 10 
1€ 
6 chance out of 10 
5 20€ 
5 chance out of 10 
16€ 
5 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
5 chance out of 10 
1€ 
5 chance out of 10 
6 20€ 
6 chance out of 10 
16€ 
4 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
6 chance out of 10 
1€ 
4 chance out of 10 
7 20€ 
7 chance out of 10 
16€ 
3 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
7 chance out of 10 
1€ 
3 chance out of 10 
8 20€ 
8 chance out of 10 
16€ 
2 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
8 chance out of 10 
1€ 
2 chance out of 10 
9 20€ 
9 chances out of 10 
16€ 
1 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
9 chance out of 10 
1€ 
1 chance out of 10 
10 20€ 
10 chances out of 10 
16€ 
0 chance out of 10 
38,5€ 
10 chances out of 10 
1€ 






Question Lottery A Lottery B 
11 
400€ 
1chance out of 10 
320€  
9 chances out of 10 
770€ 
1chance out of 10 
20€ 
9 chances out of 10 
12 400€ 
2 chances out of 10 
320€  
8 chances out of 10 
770€ 
2 chances out of 10 
20€ 
8 chances out of 10 
13 400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
320€  
7 chances out of 10 
770€ 
3 chances out of 10 
20€ 
7 chances out of 10 
14 400€ 
4 chances out of 10 
320€  
6 chances out of 10 
770€ 
4 chances out of 10 
20€ 
6 chances out of 10 
15 400€ 
5 chances out of 10 
320€  
5 chances out of 10 
770€ 
5 chances out of 10 
20€ 
5 chances out of 10 
16 400€ 
6 chances out of 10 
320€  
4 chances out of 10 
770€ 
6 chances out of 10 
20€ 
4 chances out of 10 
17 400€ 
7 chances out of 10 
320€  
3 chances out of 10 
770€ 
 7 chances out of 10 
20€ 
3 chances out of 10 
18 400€ 
8 chances out of 10 
320€  
2 chances out of 10 
770€ 
8 chances out of 10 
20€ 
2 chances out of 10 
19 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
320€  
1 chance out of 10 
770€ 
9chance out of 10 
20€ 
1 chance out of 10 
20 400€ 
10 chances out of 10 
320€  
0 chance out of 10 
770€ 
10 chances out of 10 
20€ 
0 chance out of 10 
 
Question Lottery A Lottery B 
21 
-38,5€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-1€ 
9 chances out of 10  
-20€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-16€ 
9 chances out of 10 
22 -38,5€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
8 chances out of 10 
23 -38,5€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
7 chances out of 10 
24 -38,5€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
6 chances out of 10 
25 -38,5€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
5 chances out of 10 
26 -38,5€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
4 chances out of 10 
27 -38,5€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
3 chances out of 10 
28 -38,5€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
2 chances out of 10 
29 -38,5€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-1€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-20€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-16€ 
1 chance out of 10 
30 
-38,5€ 
10 chances out of 
10 
-1€ 
0 chance out of 10 
-20€ 
10 chances out of 10 
-16€ 










Question Lottery A Lottery B 
31 
-770€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-20€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
1 chance out of 10 
32 -770€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
2 chances out of 10 
33 -770€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
34 -770€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
4 chances out of 10 
35 -770€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
5 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
5 chances out of 10 
36 -770€ 
6 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
4 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
6 chances out of 10 
37 -770€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
3 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
7 chances out of 10 
38 -770€ 
8 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-320€ 
2 chances out of 10 
-400€ 
8 chances out of 10 
39 -770€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-320€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
40 -770€ 
10 chances out of 10 
-20€ 
0 chance out of 10 
-320€ 
0 chance out of 10 
-400€ 
10 chances out of 10 
 
Question Loterie A Loterie B 
1 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
680€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
2 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
750€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
3 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
830€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
4 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
930€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
5 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
1065€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
6 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
1250€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
7 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
1500€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
8 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
1850€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
9 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
2200€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
10 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
3000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
11 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
4000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
12 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
6000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
13 400€ 100€ 10000€ 50€ 
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Annex 7 : Set of lotteries in the gain and loss domains with fixed probabilities 
Question Lottery A Lottery B 
15 
400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
540€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
16 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
560€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
17 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
580€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
18 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
600€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
19 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
620€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
20 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
650€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
21 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
680€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
22 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
720€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
23 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
770€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
24 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
830€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
25 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
900€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
26 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
1000€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
27 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
1100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
28 400€ 
9 chances out of 10 
300€ 
1 chance out of 10 
1300€ 
7 chances out of 10 
50€ 
3 chances out of 10 
 
 
Question Lottery A Lottery B 
29 
250€  
5 chances out of 10 
-40€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-210€  
5 chances out of 10 
30 40€  
5 chances out of 10 
-40€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-210€  
5 chances out of 10 
31 50€  
5 chances out of 10 
-40€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-210€  
5 chances out of 10 
32 50€  
5 chances out of 10 
-40€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-160€  
5 chances out of 10 
33 50€  
5 chances out of 10 
-80€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-160€  
5 chances out of 10 
34 50€  
5 chances out of 10 
-80€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-140€  
5 chances out of 10 
35 50€  
5 chances out of 10 
-80€  
5 chances out of 10 
300€  
5 chances out of 10 
-110€  
5 chances out of 10 
3 chances out of 10 7 chances out of 10 1 chance out of 10 9 chances out of 10 
14 
400€ 
3 chances out of 10 
100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
17000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
50€ 






Question Lottery A Lottery B 
36 
-680€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
37 -750€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
38 -830€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
39 -930€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
40 -1065€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
41 -1250€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
42 -1500€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
43 -1850€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
44 -2200€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
45 -3000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
46 -4000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
47 -6000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
48 -10000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 
3 chances out of 10 
49 -17000€ 
1 chance out of 10 
-50€ 
9 chances out of 10 
-100€ 
7 chances out of 10 
-300€ 




Annex 8 : Sale price for the 2010-2011 campaign 
Crop Price (€/t) 
Durum wheat 200 






Oilseed rape 330 
Rape seed 450 
 
